Deceiving Google's Perspective API Built for Detecting Toxic Comments by Hosseini, Hossein et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
2.
08
13
8v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
7 F
eb
 20
17
Deceiving Google’s Perspective API Built for
Detecting Toxic Comments
Hossein Hosseini, Sreeram Kannan, Baosen Zhang and Radha Poovendran
Network Security Lab (NSL), Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, WA
Email: {hosseinh, ksreeram, zhangbao, rp3}@uw.edu
Abstract—Social media platforms provide an environment
where people can freely engage in discussions. Unfortunately,
they also enable several problems, such as online harass-
ment. Recently, Google and Jigsaw started a project called
Perspective, which uses machine learning to automatically
detect toxic language. A demonstration website has been also
launched, which allows anyone to type a phrase in the interface
and instantaneously see the toxicity score [1].
In this paper, we propose an attack on the Perspective
toxic detection system based on the adversarial examples. We
show that an adversary can subtly modify a highly toxic phrase
in a way that the system assigns significantly lower toxicity score
to it. We apply the attack on the sample phrases provided in
the Perspective website and show that we can consistently
reduce the toxicity scores to the level of the non-toxic phrases.
The existence of such adversarial examples is very harmful for
toxic detection systems and seriously undermines their usability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social media platforms provide an environment where peo-
ple can learn about the trends and news, freely share their
opinions and engage in discussions. Unfortunately, the lack
of a moderating entity in these platforms has caused several
problems, ranging from the wide spread of fake news to online
harassment [2]. Due to the growing concern about the impact
of online harassment on the people’s experience of the Internet,
many platforms are taking steps to enhance the safety of the
online environments [3], [4].
Some of the platforms employ approaches such as refining
the information based on crowdsourcing (upvotes/downvotes),
turning off comments or manual moderation to mitigate the
effect of the inappropriate contents [5]. These approaches
however are inefficient and not scalable. As a result, there
has been many calls for researchers to develop methods
to automatically detect abusive or toxic context in the real
time [6].
Recent advances in machine learning have transformed
many domains such as computer vision [7], speech recogni-
tion [8], and language processing [9]. Many researchers have
explored using machine learning to also tackle the problem
of online harassment. Recently, Google and Jigsaw launched
a project called Perspective [1], which uses machine
learning to automatically detect online insults, harassment,
and abusive speech. The system intends to bring Conversation
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AI to help with providing a safe environment for online
discussions [10].
Perspective is an API that enables the developers to
use the toxic detector running on Google’s servers, to identify
harassment and abuse on social media or more efficiently
filtering invective from the comments on a news website.
Jigsaw has partnered with online communities and publishers,
such as Wikipedia [3] and The New York Times [11], to
implement this toxicity measurement system.
Recently, a demonstration website has been launched, which
allows anyone to type a phrase in the Perspective’s
interface and instantaneously see how it rates on the “toxicity”
scale [1]. The Perspective website has also open sourced
the experiments, models and research data in order to explore
the strengths and weaknesses of using machine learning as a
tool for online discussion.
The implicit assumption of learning models is that they will
be deployed in benign settings. However, many works have
pointed out their vulnerability in adversarial scenarios [12]–
[14]. One type of the vulnerabilities of machine learning
algorithms is that an adversary can change the algorithm
output by subtly perturbing the input, often unnoticeable by
humans. Such inputs are called adversarial examples [15],
and have been shown to be effective against different machine
learning algorithms even when the adversary has only a black-
box access to the target model [16].
In this paper, we demonstrate the vulnerability of the
recently-released Google’s Perspective system against the
adversarial examples. In the text classification task of the
Perspective, adversarial examples can be defined as mod-
ified texts which contain the same highly abusive language as
the original text, yet receive a significantly lower toxicity score
from the learning model. Through different experiments, we
show that an adversary can deceive the system by misspelling
the abusive words or by adding punctuations between the let-
ters. The existence of adversarial examples is very harmful for
toxic detector systems and seriously undermines their usability,
especially since these systems are likely to be employed in
adversarial settings. We conclude the paper by proposing some
countermeasures to the proposed attack.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief Description of Google’s Perspective API
Perspective is an API created by Jigsaw and Google’s
Counter Abuse Technology team in Conversation-AI. Conver-
sation AI is a collaborative research effort exploring ML as a
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TABLE I: Demosntration of the Attack on the Perspective Toxic Detection System . All phrases in the first column of
the table are chosen from the examples provided by the Perspective website [1].
Original Phrase (Toxicity Score) Modified Phrase (Toxicity Score)
Climate change is happening and it’s not changing in our
favor. If you think differently you’re an idiot. (84%)
Climate change is happening and it’s not changing in our
favor. If you think differently you’re an idiiot. (20%)
They’re stupid, it’s getting warmer, we should enjoy it while
it lasts (86%)
They’re st.upid, it’s getting warmer, we should enjoy it
while it lasts (2%)
They are liberal idiots who are uneducated (90%) They are liberal i.diots who are un.educated (15%)
idiots. backward thinking people. nationalists. not accept-
ing facts. susceptible to lies. (80%)
idiiots. backward thinking people. nationaalists. not accept-
ing facts. susceptible to l.ies. (17%)
They are stupid and ignorant with no class (91%) They are st.upid and ig.norant with no class (11%)
It’s stupid and wrong (89%) It’s stuipd and wrong (17%)
If they voted for Hilary they are idiots (90%) If they voted for Hilary they are id.iots (12%)
Anyone who voted for Trump is a moron (80%) Anyone who voted for Trump is a mo.ron (13%)
Screw you trump supporters (79%) S c r e w you trump supporters (17%)
tool for better discussions online [17]. The API uses machine
learning models to score the toxicity of an input text, where
toxic is defined as “a rude, disrespectful, or unreasonable
comment that is likely to make one leave a discussion.”
Google and Jigsaw developed the measurement tool by
taking millions of comments from different publishers and
then asking panels of ten people to rate the comments on
a scale from “very toxic” to “very healthy” contribution. The
resulting judgments provided a large set of training examples
for the machine learning model.
Jigsaw has partnered with online communities and publish-
ers to implement the toxicity measurement system. Wikipedia
use it to perform a study of its editorial discussion pages [3]
and The New York Times is planning to use it as a first
pass of all its comments, automatically flagging abusive ones
for its team of human moderators [11]. The API outputs the
scores in real-time, so that publishers can integrate it into their
website to show toxicity ratings to commenters even during
the typing [5].
B. Adversarial Examples for Learning Systems
Machine learning models are generally designed to yield the
best performance on clean data and in benign settings. As a
result, they are subject to attacks in adversarial scenarios [12]–
[14]. One type of the vulnerabilities of the machine learning
algorithms is that an adversary can change the algorithm
prediction score by perturbing the input slightly, often un-
noticeable by humans. Such inputs are called adversarial
examples [15].
Adversarial examples have been applied to models for
different tasks, such as images classification [15], [18], [19],
music content analysis [20] and malware classification [21]. In
this work, we generate adversarial examples on a real-world
text classifier system. In the context of scoring the toxicity,
adversarial examples can be defined as modified phrases that
contain the same highly abusive language as the original one,
yet receive a significantly lower toxicity score by the model.
In a similar work [22], the authors presented a method
for gender obfuscating in social media writing. The proposed
method modifies the text such that the algorithm classifies
the writer gender as a certain target gender, under limited
knowledge of the classifier and while preserving the text’s
fluency and meaning. The modified text is not required to
be adversarial, i.e., a human may also classify it as the
target gender. In contrast, in the application of toxic text
detection, the adversary intends to deceive the classifier, while
maintaining the abusive content of the text.
III. THE PROPOSED ATTACKS
Recently, a website has been launched for Perspective
demonstration, which allows anyone to type a phrase in the
interface and instantaneously receive its toxicity score [1]. The
website provides samples phrases for three categories of topics
“that are often difficult to discuss online”. The categories are
1) Climate Change, 2) Brexit and 3) US Election.
In this section, we demonstrate an attack on the
Perspective toxic detection system, based on the adver-
sarial examples. In particular, we show that an adversary can
subtly modify a toxic phrase such that the model will output
a very low toxicity score for the modified phrase. The attack
setting is as follows. The adversary possesses a phrase with
a toxic content and tries different perturbations on the words,
until she succeeds with significantly reducing the confidence
of the model that the phrase is toxic. Note that the adversary
does not have access to the model or training data, and can
only query the model and get the toxicity score.
Table I demonstrates the attack on sample phrases provided
by the Perspective website. The first column represents
the original phrases along with the toxicity scores and the
second column provides the adversarially modified phrases and
their corresponding toxicity scores. 1 For better demonstration
of the attack, we chose phrases with different toxic words and
also introduced different types of errors, rather than searching
for the best error type that would potentially yield lower
toxicity score. The boldface words are the toxic words that
the adversary has modified. The modifications are adding a
1The experiments are done on the interface of the Perspective website
on Feb. 24, 2017.
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TABLE II: Demosntration of False Alarm on the Perspective Toxic Detection System . All phrases in the first column of
the table are chosen from the examples provided by the Perspective website [1]
.
Original Phrase (Toxicity Score) Modified Phrase (Toxicity Score)
Climate change is happening and it’s not changing in our
favor. If you think differently you’re an idiot (84%)
Climate change is happening and it’s not changing in our
favor. If you think differently you’re not an idiot (73%)
They’re stupid, it’s getting warmer, we should enjoy it while
it lasts (86%)
They’re not stupid, it’s getting warmer, we should enjoy it
while it lasts (74%)
They are liberal idiots who are uneducated. (90%) They are not liberal idiots who are uneducated. (83%)
idiots. backward thinking people. nationalists. not accepting
facts. susceptible to lies. (80%)
not idiots. not backward thinking people. not nationalists.
accepting facts. not susceptible to lies. (74%)
They are stupid and ignorant with no class (91%) They are not stupid and ignorant with no class (84%)
It’s stupid and wrong (89%) It’s not stupid and wrong (83%)
If they voted for Hilary they are idiots (90%) If they voted for Hilary they are not idiots (81%)
Anyone who voted for Trump is a moron (80%) Anyone who voted for Trump is not a moron (65%)
Screw you trump supporters (79%) Will not screw you trump supporters (68%)
dot between two letters, adding spaces between all letters or
misspelling the word (repeating one letter twice or swapping
two letters). As can be seen, we can consistently reduce the
toxicity score to the level of the benign phrases by subtly
modifying the toxic words.
Moreover, we observed that the adversarial perturbations
transfer among different phrases, i.e., if a certain modification
to a word reduces the toxicity score of a phrase, the same
modification to the word is likely to reduce the toxicity score
also for another phrase. Using this property, an adversary can
form a dictionary of the adversarial perturbations for every
word and significantly simplify the attack process.
Through the experiments, we made the following observa-
tions:
• Susceptibility to false alarm: we observed that the
Perspective system also wrongly assigns high tox-
icity scores to the apparently benign phrases. Table II
demonstrates the false alarm on the same sample phrases
of Table I. The first column represents the original phrases
along with the toxicity scores and the second column pro-
vides the negated phrases and the corresponding toxicity
scores. The boldface words are added to toxic phrases. As
can be seen, the system consistently fails to capture the
inherent semantic of the modified phrases and wrongly
assigns high toxicity scores to them.
• Robustness to random misspellings: we observed that
the system assigns 34% toxicity score to most of the
misspelled and random words. Also, it is somewhat robust
to phrases that contain randomly modified toxic words.
• Vulnerability to poisoning attack: The Perspective
interface allows users to provide a feedback on the
toxicity score of phrases, suggesting that the learning
algorithm updates itself using the new data. This can ex-
pose the system to poisoning attacks, where an adversary
modifies the training data (in this case, the labels) so that
the model assigns low toxicity scores to certain phrases.
IV. OPEN PROBLEMS IN DEFENSE METHODS
The developers of Perspective have mentioned that the
system is in the early days of research and development, and
that the experiments, models, and research data are published
to explore the strengths and weaknesses of using machine
learning as a tool for online discussion.
In section III, we showed the vulnerability of the
Perspective system against the adversarial examples.
Scoring the semantic toxicity of a phrase is clearly a very
challenging task. In this following, we briefly review some of
the possible approaches for improving the robustness of the
toxic detection systems:
• Adversarial Training: In this approach, during the training
phase, we generate the adversarial examples and train
the model to assign the original label to them [18].
In the context of toxic detection systems, we need to
include different modified versions of the toxic words into
the training data. While this approach may improve the
robustness of the system against the adversarial examples,
it does not seem practical to train the model on all variants
of every word.
• Spell checking: Many of the adversarial examples can be
detected by first applying a spell checking filter before
the toxic detection system. This approach may however
increase the false alarm.
• Blocking suspicious users for a period of time: The
adversary needs to try different error patterns to finally
evade the toxic detection system. Once a user fails to pass
the threshold for a number of times, the system can block
her for a while. This approach can force the users to less
often use toxic language.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an attack on the recently-
released Google’s Perspective API built for detecting
toxic comments. We showed that the system can be deceived
by slightly perturbing the abusive phrases to receive very low
toxicity scores, while preserving the intended meaning. We
also showed that the system has high false alarm rate in scoring
high toxicity to benign phrases. We provided detailed examples
for the studied cases. Our future work includes development
of countermeasures against such attacks.
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Disclaimer: The phrases used in Tables I and II are chosen
from the examples provided in the Perspective website [1]
for the purpose of demonstrating the results and do not
represent the view or opinions of the authors or sponsoring
agencies.
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